

(pagination correction, for table alignment in sample pdf file)

Extract from Volume IIB.5.2)

## 2) The Order of Battle and Actual Strength of all Luftwaffe Air Combat Units in a Deployed (D) State on 21st June 1941

### a. Luftwaffe Higher Level Organisation and Deployment on 21st June 1941

The Luftwaffe higher-level organisation and chain of command, on the eve of Operation Barbarossa, was as shown in diagram Luft CofC (pages 204-205). There were five *Luftflotte* in existence at this time, of which three and a half were deployed in the East. These were Luftflotte 1, 2, 4 and around half of Luftflotte 5, which represented 67% of the Luftwaffe's total combat-aircraft strength.<sup>1</sup> This means that the Luftwaffe was only able to field around two thirds of its total front-line air strength against the principal enemy in 1941: the USSR.

For Operation Barbarossa the Luftwaffe's initial deployment area extended behind an approximately 1 600km broad front, encompassing the front-lines of the German, Hungarian and Rumanian Armies. It was aimed at an enemy front line roughly 2 400 km long between Odessa and Leningrad. Added to this was the Finnish-German front line of about 1 000kms. The Luftwaffe's deployment was adapted to meet the operational and strategic objectives of the German Army, with three primary tasks. These were: the initial elimination of the Soviet Air Force (the VVS) in the Western Military Districts (by destroying them on the ground), protecting German ground forces by destroying VVS bomber units in the air and maintaining air-superiority over the front lines, and direct support of the army on the battlefield. Essentially, each Army Group had a *Luftflotte* assigned to it, and each Army or Panzer Group at the points of main effort had a *Fliegerkorps* assigned to it.

Of vital importance to the Luftwaffe's preparation and deployment in the East, and its ability to maintain ongoing offensive operations, was the work of the *Luftgaukommandos* (Air district commands). These HQs were responsible for the Luftwaffe's ground forces supporting the air operations: an efficient and effective ground organisation was a prerequisite for successful operations by the air formations. The *Luftgaukommando* HQs in the East cooperated closely with the staffs in their assigned *Luftflotte* and *Fliegerkorps*. As well as managing the logistical supply of the air-combat units, the *Luftgaukommando* managed the Luftwaffe construction battalions and the Reich Labour Service (RAD) battalions which built and enlarged the airfields. These units were extremely busy in May 1941 making the final preparations for Operation Barbarossa. For example, Luftgaukommando II enlarged or laid out 105 airfields in preparation for the first phase of the campaign; and it mostly managed to do this while maintaining the security conditions needed for secrecy.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to supporting the initial phase of Operation Barbarossa, the *Luftgaukommandos* had to organise and manage the establishment of the support infrastructures in the newly occupied territories. This included the rapid establishment of new airfields or/and the restoration of captured airfields, supporting the flying units in reconnaissance of new airfields, and moving forward the logistical supply systems to ensure the 'new' airfields were adequately supplied in all respects (especially aviation fuel, ammunition and spare parts). To fulfil this considerable task the Luftwaffe formed two *Luftgaustabe* z.b.V. (Air district staff for special purpose) for each *Luftflotte* supporting Army Groups North, Centre and South. The *Luftgaustabe* z.b.V. and their staffs represented an 'extended arm' of the *Luftgaukommando*, using a system that had been tried and tested, and had proved successful, during previous campaigns.

In practice a *Luftgaustabe* z.b.V. usually worked closely with a particular *Fliegerkorps* as its air-unit bases were moved forward into enemy territory. As we can see from diagram Luft CofC, there were sufficient *Luftgaustabe* z.b.V. for each of the *Fliegerkorps* supporting Army Groups North, Centre and South to be allocated a dedicated support HQ. This was especially critical for *Fliegerkorps* containing *Jagdgeschwader* (Fighter aviation wings), *Sturzkampfgeschwader* (Dive-bomber aviation wings) and *Schlachtgeschwader* (Ground attack aviation wings). This was because of the relatively short operational ranges of these aircraft types, because they used large amounts of fuel and ammunition during offensive operations, and because StG and SchG units provided (by far) the most effective close air-support for the ground troops. The effectiveness of close air-support was greatly enhanced by the air-bases being relatively close to the front lines: the response time (onto target) was reduced and the number of missions per day per aircraft was increased.

The details on each *Luftflotte*'s organisation, as well as the details of the air combat units within each *Luftflotte*, *Fliegerkorps*, *Fliegerfuhrer* and *Luftwaffenkommando*, are examined in the following sections.

<sup>1</sup> 3 297 combat-aircraft out of 4 948 available. This excludes transport aircraft in KGr zbV and LLG Units, and courier, liaison and transport aircraft in *Kurierstaffeln*, *Verbindungsstaffeln* and *Sanitätsflugbereitschaften*.

<sup>2</sup> The campaign start was initially set for 15th May 1941, so the *Luftgaukommandos* were working to this timeline until April 1941. H. Boog, et al, German Research Institute for Military History at Potsdam, Germany and the Second World War-Volume IV: The Attack on the Soviet Union, Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press), New York, 1996, p. 360.

In addition to the air-combat and air-support units, the Luftwaffe also contributed two Flak Corps to support Operation Barbarossa. These were the 1st Flak Corps supporting Army Group Centre and the 2nd Flak Corps supporting Army Group South. In total, 20% of the Wehrmacht's (Luftwaffe's and Army's) heavy flak batteries, and 15% of all medium and light flak batteries, were deployed in the East in June 1941.<sup>3</sup>


Although the 1st and 2nd Flak Corps reported to Luftflotte 2 and 4, respectively, this was an administrative function: the flak units in the 1st and 2nd Flak Corps were under the tactical and operational control of the German Army. As such they were used in much the same way as the army's flak units. The Luftwaffe flak batteries were fully motorised so they could operate with the army's motorised (panzer) corps; and they were used to engage ground targets (including, most famously, T-34 and KV tanks) whilst providing anti-aircraft protection for ground troops and supply lines near the front lines.

For Operation Barbarossa the 1st Flak Corps was primarily assigned to support the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups, while the 2nd Flak Corps was assigned to support the 1st Panzer Group. The Luftwaffe flak corps HQs, flak regiments and flak battalions are treated as German ground combat units in the German FILARM model, in exactly the same way as the German Army's flak units.


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<sup>3</sup> H. Boog, et al, German Research Institute for Military History at Potsdam, Germany and the Second World War-Volume IV: The Attack on the Soviet Union, Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press), New York, 1996, Table I.IV.8., p. 376.



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## b. Luftflotte 1

On 21st June 1941, Luftflotte 1, commanded by Generaloberst Alfred Keller, was deployed in East Prussia with orders to support Army Group North. The distribution of available and serviceable aircraft in Luftflotte 1, and the units they were assigned to on 21st June 1941, are shown in table [Luft 1](#).<sup>4</sup>

The principle air-support for Army Group North's 18th Army, 16th Army and 4th Panzer Group was to be provided by the I. Fliegerkorps, commanded by General der Flieger Helmuth Forster. I. Fliegerkorps was to support the Operations of Army Group North from East Prussia towards the Dvina River and then further on towards Leningrad. It was ordered to cooperate especially closely with 4th Panzer Group during its drive towards Leningrad. The main striking power of I. Fliegerkorps initially resided in only 159 fighters and 241 medium bombers, which was a small force when one considers that I. Fliegerkorps' operational area consisted of a 200km front extending eastwards to a depth of around 850km (to Leningrad). Even worse was the fact that I. Fliegerkorps had no close-support units: all the bomber *Geschwader* contained Ju 88 aircraft. The Ju 88 was a fast medium bomber and was not designed to provide close-air support to ground troops. It was only the outstanding design of this aircraft and its suitably trained crews, which gave the Ju 88 enough flexibility to be used in this role (albeit imperfectly). The only concession to providing 4th Panzer Group with any really effective close air support was to issue two of the supporting *Kampfgeschwader* with anti-personnel fragmentation bombs.<sup>5</sup>

As far as Operation Barbarossa was concerned the most important naval area was the Baltic Sea. This was because Army Group North's objectives included the invasion and control of Latvia and Estonia, both with extensive Baltic Sea coastlines on Army Group North's northern flank. In addition the Germans needed to protect their iron ore supplies, coming from Sweden via the Baltic Sea, from attack by the Soviet Baltic Red Banner Fleet. On 22nd June 1941 this force included two old battleships, a heavy cruiser, a light cruiser, 19 destroyers of varying age and size and (most dangerously) 65 submarines.<sup>6</sup> With this force the Soviets could interdict the German supply convoys and interfere with any planned German naval activity in the Baltic Sea. The *Kriegsmarine* (German Navy) could only commit minimal resources in support of Operation Barbarossa because the vast majority of its resources were already committed to fighting the Royal Navy in the North Sea and North Atlantic. For example, only five small coastal U-boats were available for use in the Baltic Sea on 22nd June 1941.<sup>7</sup> Therefore in order to gain control of the Baltic Sea the Germans relied on two things; extensive naval minefields and naval-air power.

For controlling Baltic Sea operations, Luftflotte 1 formed the Fliegerfuhrer Ostsee (Aviation command Baltic Sea) under the command of Oberstleutnant Wolfgang von Wild.<sup>8</sup> Fliegerfuhrer Ostsee's initial duties included: guarding the coastal flank from surprise attacks by Soviet naval units, interdicting any Soviet naval operations (especially those by enemy submarines), protecting convoys east of 13° East, and mining the ports of Kronshtadt and Leningrad (in the Gulf of Finland). Later Fliegerfuhrer Ostsee would also be called upon to mine the Neva River as far as Shlisselburg and the White Sea Canal, attack the locks on Lake Onega, and support the army in the capture of the Baltic Islands. The main striking power of Fliegerfuhrer Ostsee, against enemy ships, came from *Kustenfliegergruppe* 806 (KuFlIGr 806 – Coastal aviation group 806): another unit in the *Luftflotte*

<sup>4</sup> Primary sources include: Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv (BA-MA) RL 2 III/700-734, Survey of target, stock, commitment, losses and reserves of flying formations (also BA-MA RL 2 III/736). Some summaries of these records can be found at the Public Records Office in the UK as AIR 40/1207 'The German Air Force: first line strength at three monthly intervals during the European War 1939-1945'. USAF Historical Research Agency, Alabama, HRA 137.306-14 on microfilm A1128. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv (BA-MA) RL 2 III/713, Report on the combat-readiness of the flying formations, 21st June 1941, GenSt GenQu 6. Abt. (1), 24th June 1941. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv (BA-MA) o.S. 234, Wall chart of the Ob.d.L as of 20th June 1941. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv (BA-MA) RH 11 III/32, OKH GenStdH/Op Abt (III) (o.D.), Pruf-Nr. 15819. Published sources include: H. Boog, et al, German Research Institute for Military History at Potsdam, Germany and the Second World War-Volume IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, Clarendon Press, New York, 1996, Tables, I.IV.5, and I.IV.6, pp. 364-370. H. L. de Zeng IV, D. G. Stankey, Dive Bomber and Ground-Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-1945: Volumes 1 and 2, Ian Allan Publishing, Hersham, Surrey, 2009 and 2013. H. L. de Zeng IV, D. J. Stankey, E. J. Creek, Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-1945: A reference Source Volumes 1 and 2, Ian Allan Publishing, Hinckley, UK, 2007 and 2008. J. R. Smith, E. J. Creek, Kampfflieger: Bombers of the Luftwaffe July 1940-December 1941, Classic-Ian Allan Publishing, Hersham UK, 2004, pp. 170 -171. B. Rosch, Luftwaffe Support Units: 1993-1945, Classic-Ian Allan Publishing, Hersham UK, 2009. H. Plocher, The German Air Force versus Russia - 1941, USAF Historical Studies 153, New York, 1968. A great deal of secondary information on individual unit history and strength data was also collated piece by piece from many of the Luftwaffe sources listed in the Bibliography.

<sup>5</sup> H. Boog, et al, German Research Institute for Military History at Potsdam, Germany and the Second World War-Volume IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press), New York, 1996, p. 367.

<sup>6</sup> Refer Volume IIB 6. – 'Soviet Naval Forces: June to December 1941'.

<sup>7</sup> Only five small Type IID coastal U-boats were available for use in the Baltic Sea on 22nd June 1941. These were U-140, U-142, U-144, U-145 and U-149. Refer Volume IIB 7. - 'German Naval Forces on the East Front: June to December 1941'.

<sup>8</sup> Fliegerfuhrer Ostsee was formed in March 1941 from Fliegerfuhrer Osten (East).

equipped with the ever versatile Ju 88. The maritime patrol and anti-submarine aircraft were supplied by *Aufklarungsgruppe* 125 (Aufkl.Gr 125 – Reconnaissance group (naval) 125) and *Seenotstaffel* 9 (Air-sea rescue squadron 9), together equipped with 48 seaplanes.<sup>9</sup> Fliegerführer Ostsee fielded a total of only 89 aircraft on 21st June 1941, and on this date all its air-units were concentrated in the immediate vicinity north and east of Königsberg.

From table [Luft 1](#) we can see that on 21st June 1941 Luftflotte 1 contained 822 combat and transport aircraft, but this included only 213 fighters and 271 twin engine bombers. The remaining 338 aircraft were all short range reconnaissance (army tactical) or long range reconnaissance aircraft, army cooperation/liaison aircraft, transport aircraft or seaplanes. Of the latter, 204 aircraft were under the operational and tactical control of ground units in Army Group North.<sup>10</sup> These comprised aircraft in the *Fernaufklarungsgruppen* (except those in 2.(F)/Ob.d.L), the *Heeresaufklarungsgruppen*, the *Panzeraufklarungsgruppen*, the *Kurierstaffeln* and the *Verbindungsstaffeln* (shown in grey on table [Luft 1](#)). Excluding the aircraft in KGr zbV units, *Kurierstaffeln*, *Verbindungsstaffeln* and *Sanitätsflugbereitschaften*, Luftflotte 1 contained a total 689 ‘combat aircraft’ (551 serviceable).

Of the total of 822 aircraft in Luftflotte 1, around 78% were serviceable. Noticeably a higher proportion of fighter and bomber aircraft were serviceable (83% and 78%, respectively), whilst transport aircraft exhibited the lowest degree of readiness (41%). It is probable that the KGr zbV units were still recovering from Operation Mercury (the airborne invasion of Crete), and had very recently been working hard transporting critical material eastwards in preparation for Operation Barbarossa. It is worth diverging here to mention that in 1941 the Luftwaffe’s daily and weekly reports for serviceable aircraft were generally much more accurate than similar reports from their VVS counterparts, and especially reports from the immediate pre-Barbarossa period. It is not unreasonable to interpret ‘serviceable’ as ‘operational’; that is to say by simply arming and fuelling these aircraft they were ready to fly combat missions. However the term ‘serviceable’ for aircraft is very subjective. It could mean anything from ‘immediately ready for aerial combat’ to ‘can get off the ground after some extensive maintenance’. For a variety of internal reasons, which are discussed in the Soviet FILARM (air) model, VVS officer reports tended to exaggerate the number of serviceable/operational aircraft during most of 1941.<sup>11</sup>

It is instructive to compare Luftflotte 1 against its immediate opponents in June 1941; namely the VVS-Baltic Special Military District (Northwestern Front from 22nd June 1941). The latter had 1 262 combat aircraft on 22nd June 1941 of which 1 078 were reported as ‘serviceable’.<sup>12</sup> This total included 744 fighters (including 140 modern Mig1/3 fighters) and 458 bombers and assault (ground-attack) aircraft. Therefore on the eve of Operations Barbarossa, Luftflotte 1 was outnumbered by its VVS opponent by 1.8 to 1 in combat aircraft. In terms of fighters and bombers the numerical disparity was 3.5 to 1 for fighters and 1.7 to 1 for bombers, in the Soviet’s favour. In terms of reconnaissance (all types) and army-cooperation aircraft, Luftflotte 1 outnumbered the VVS-Baltic Special Military District by 3.7 to 1. The latter is indicative of how important the German Army considered battlefield reconnaissance to be, and how closely the Luftwaffe was designed and organised to operate with the army.

To make matters worse for Luftflotte 1, most of the 1 336 combat aircraft initially in the VVS-Leningrad Military District (Northern Front from 24th June 1941) transferred south to face Army Group North in July 1941. This meant that even though the VVS forces originally in the Baltic Special Military District were effectively wiped out within the first week of war (around 85% of aircraft were destroyed or severely damaged), the newly formed VVS-Northwestern Zone still had a substantial numerical superiority (in combat-aircraft) over Luftflotte 1 during July and early August 1941. Refer to the Soviet FILARM air-model (Volume IIIB 3. 2)) for details on the air battles and losses over the Baltic States in June and July 1941.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> In addition, air-sea rescue missions, and probably most clandestine air-sea-land operations, were to be conducted by the seaplanes of *Seenotstaffel* 9. Note, strictly speaking, seaplanes are aircraft with floats attached to their wings and fuselage, while flying boats are aircraft which use their fuselage to displace the water and usually have small floats on the wings.

<sup>10</sup> H. Boog, et al, Table, I.IV.5, p. 364, shows 176 aircraft (143 serviceable) under Army control. This only includes the *Fernaufklarungsgruppen* (52), *Heeresaufklarungsgruppen* (87) and *Kurierstaffeln* (37), as per the data in table [Luft 1](#).

<sup>11</sup> Many VVS status reports for June 1941 claimed that an average of 80-95% of their combat aircraft were serviceable and hence could be considered operational. However, there is little doubt that these reports were based on overly optimistic VVS commander assessments in the period prior to June 1941. Refer Volume IIIB 3. 2) a. – ‘The Soviet Air Forces in 1941 - The Order of Battle and Actual Strength of all Soviet Air Combat Units in a Deployed (D) State on 22nd June 1941 - Aircraft Serviceability and Numbers of Operational Aircraft’.

<sup>12</sup> Refer Volume IIIB 3. 2) c. – ‘The Soviet Air Forces in 1941 - The Order of Battle and Actual Strength of all Soviet Air Combat Units in a Deployed (D) State on 22nd June 1941 - VVS-Baltic Special Military District’.

<sup>13</sup> Refer Volume IIIB 3. 2) c. – ‘VVS-Baltic Special Military District’ and Volume IIIB 3. 2) b. – ‘VVS-Leningrad Military District’.

Deployment and Composition of Luftwaffe Air Units, 21st June 1941									
Luftflotte 1									
I. Fliegerkorps									
Description	No x	Type/Auth	Av	Sv	Description	No x	Type/Auth	Av	Sv
JG (Jagdgeschwader)									
Stab/JG 54	4	4xBf-109F	4	3					
I./JG 54	40	40xBf-109F	40	34					
II./JG 54	40	40xBf-109E/F	40	33					
III./JG 54	40	40xBf-109F	40	35					
4./JG 53*	35	28xBf-109F	35	33					
KG (Kampfgeschwader)									
Bom ber.									
Stab/KG 1^	1	4xHe111H^/Ju-88A	1	1					
II./KG 1**	29	40xJu-88A	29	27					
III./KG 1	30	40xJu-88A	30	29					
Stab/KG 76	1	4xJu-88A	1	0					
I./KG 76	30	40xJu-88A	30	22					
II./KG 76	30	40xJu-88A	30	25					
III./KG 76	29	40xJu-88A	29	22					
Stab/KG 77**^	1	4xJu-88A	1	1					
I./KG 77^^	30	40xJu-88A	30	23					
II./KG 77^^	31	40xJu-88A	31	23					
III./KG 77***	29	40xJu-88A	29	20					
Aufkl Gr (Aufklarungsgruppe)									
Reconnaissance.									
I./Aufkl.Gr 125 (S)**^	12x	He-114, He-60	12	10					
Stab, 2./Aufkl.Gr 125 (S)^	16x	He-114, He-60	15	13					
3./Aufkl.Gr 125 (S)**,*^	12x	Ar-95A	8	7					
H (Heeresaufklarungsgruppe)									
Short Range Tactical Reconnaissance.									
2.(H)/21**	4x	Hs126	8	6					
7.(H)/21**^	12x	Hs-126	7	6					
4.(H)/21^^	12x	Hs-126	7	6					
2.(Pz)/23***	12x	Hs-126	9	9					
3.(Pz)/23***	12x	Hs-126/Fw-189	10	8					
4.(H)/31***	12x	Fw-189 (pos some Do-17P)	7	5					
3.(H)/32***^	12x	Hs-126	8	5					
3.(Pz)/41***^	12x	Hs-126	10	8					
1.(H)/12**^	12x	Fw-189	7	6					
2.(H)/13^^^	12x	Hs-126/Fw-189	7	6					
4.(H)/23^^^	12x	Hs-126	7	5					
2.(F)/Ob.d.L*	12x	(see note *)	4,3,1,2	7					
3.(F)/Nacht^	12x	Do-215B, Do-17P, He-111H	9	7					
1.(F)/22^	12x	Ju-88A/D	11	8					
4.(F)/33^*	12x	Bf-110G/E	11	9					
KGr-zbV 106	53x	Ju-52	44	8					
F (Fernaufklarungsgruppe)									
Long Range Strategic Reconnaissance.									
5.(F)/122	12x	(see note **^)	10	8					
3.(F)/22	12x	(see note ^^*)	11	9					
KGr-zbV (Kampfgeschwader zu besonderen Verwendung) Transport.									
I. Korps Tr.-Sta	16x	Ju-52	18	14					

Extract from Volume IIB 5



<p><b>Wekusta (Wettererkundungsstaffel) Weather Observation.</b></p>			<p>8xJu-88A/D, He-111J, Ju-52/3m</p>	<p>6</p>
<p><b>KuFlGr (Kustenfliegergruppe) Coastal Aviation.</b></p>		<p>52xJu-88A</p>		<p>18</p>
<p><b>(Seenotstaffel) Air-Sea Rescue.</b></p>		<p>14xHe-59</p>		<p>10</p>
<p><b>(Kurierstaffel) Courier/Liaison.</b>  <b>(Verbindungsstaffel) Communication/Liaison.</b>  <b>(Sanitätsflugbereitschaft) Ambulance Flight.</b></p>	<p>* 4.,5./IG53 and a Stabschwarm present only. At this time 6./IG 53 was at Dobertitz.          ^ One He-111H was available and in service. Note, I./KG 1 was renamed III./KG 40 on 1st April 1941, and was not reformed until June 1942.          ** Unit handed over Ju-88s to III./KG 1 and withdrawn to Instertburg in East Prussia on 12th September 1941 (to refit with Ju-88A-4s). It returned to the East Front (Northern Sector) ca 9th October 1941.          ** Stab./KG 77 was withdrawn in Dec. 1941. In early January 1942 it was assigned to the II. Fliegerkorps (newly transferred to the Med.) for operations against Malta and over North Africa.          ^^ I./KG 77 was withdrawn to Germany for rest and reequipping ca mid-Nov. 1941. It returned to the East Front (Central Sector) ca 7th January 1942.          ^^ II./KG 77 was withdrawn in Oct/early Nov. 1941. Assigned to II. Fliegerkorps and operated against Malta in Dec. 1941.          *** III./KG 77 was withdrawn in Nov 1941. Assigned to the II. Fliegerkorps and operated against Malta in Jan. 1942.          ***^ Aircraft types: 12xJu-88A, Bf-110D/E.</p>	<p>9. Seenotstaffel</p>	<p>Kurierkette PzGrp 4^^ Fi-156          Kurierstaffel 12** Fi-156, Fw-58          Kurierstaffel 9^^ Fi-156, Fw-44 and W-34          Kurierstaffel 2*^^ Fi-156, Fw-58 and W-34          Verbindungsstaffel 1~ Misc types (refer text).          Verbindungsstaffel 52*~ F-156, Ar-66 and Fw-58          Verbindungsstaffel 53*~ F-156, Ar-66, Fw-58 and W-34          Verbindungsstaffel 54*~ F-156, Ar-66, Si-202 and W-34          Verbindungsstaffel 55*~ F-156, W-34, Fw-58 and Kl-35          Verbindungsstaffel 60*~ F-156 and Ar-66          Sanitätsflugbereitschaft I 6x Ju-52~*</p>	<p>9 6          9 8          10 10          9 8          6 6          4 4          5 5          4 4          4 4          6 6</p>
<p><b>(Sanitätsflugbereitschaft) Ambulance Flight.</b></p>	<p>* Air Commander Baltic Sea.          ^ Comprised Stab., 2. and 3./KGr 806, and 1. and 2./KGr 106. 1. and 2./KGr 106 were withdrawn to France/Holland in July 1941. 1./KGr 806 joined other 806 Staffel in July 1941. KGr 806 was withdrawn to Germany for rest and refit ca 13th Nov. 1941, and then to Sicily with II. Fliegerkorps ca 18th Dec. 1941. KuFlGr 806 was redesignated III./KG 54 on 1st Sep. 1942.          ** This was the only unit with the Ar-95, with 8 on strength on 22nd June 1941.          1 Kette/125 (1 Flight) transferred to Luftflotte 4, by Oct 1941. After a brief deployment to Finland, 3./Aufkl.Gr 125 (S) reequipped with BV-138C in late 1941, for operations in the Black Sea (based at Constanza). Note, this unit is commonly designated 3. (F)/SAGr. 125.          ** Reequipped with BV-138Cs in late 1941-42.          ^^ Reequipped with Ar-196s in late 1941.          ** Aircraft types: 12x Bf-110C/E, Ju-88D.</p>	<p>* Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, reports directly to C in C Luftwaffe (Hermann Goring). Possibly still had two BV-142 on strength. One Kette (w Do-215 and He-111) was based at Luonetjärvi, Finland.          ^ Aircraft types: 12xJu-88D, Do-215B, He-111, BV-142.          ^ Attached directly to Koluft Nord, Kommandeur der Luftstreitkräfte, (Army Group North Coordinator attached to the Army).          ** Attached to Koluft 18, (18th Army).          ** Attached to I Corps.          ^^ Attached to XXVI Corps.          ^^ Attached to Koluft 4 Pz Gr; (4th Pz Group).          ^^ Kurierkette PzGrp 4 was formed in June 1941.          *** Attached to Gruft 23, (XXXI Mot Cps)          *** Attached to Gruft 13, (LVI Mot Cps)          *^^ Attached to Koluft 16, (16th Army).          ^^ Attached to II Corps.          ^^ Attached to XXVIII Corps.          ^^* Ergänzungs (sometimes operational Training and Replacement) Gruppen, reporting to Luftgaukommando I. (Both Gruppen in reserve at Neuhausen).          ~ Disbanded in Nov. 1941. Misc types included early Arado biplanes, C-445, Fi-156, Fw-58, Ju-52, W-34 and Kl-35, at various times.          *~ Disbanded in November 1941.          ~~ Disbanded in December 1941.          ~* 4 Fi-156 were added to the TOE in late 1941 or 1942.</p>	<p>Wekusta 1</p>	<p>8 6</p>

<b>Table Luft 1 (cont.)</b>			
<b>Luftflotte 1, Totals</b>			
<b>Unit Type</b>	<b>No. of Units</b>	<b>No. of Aircraft</b>	
		<b>Avail</b>	<b>Svcble</b>
Jagdgruppen	3 2/3	159	138
Erg.Guppen (JG,ZG)	2	54	38
Schlachtgruppen	0	0	0
Zerstorergruppen	0	0	0
Kampfgruppen	9 1/3	271	211
Stukagruppen	0	0	0
(Pz) Staffeln	3	29	25
(H) Staffeln	8	58	45
Luft (F) Staffeln	1	10	7
Heeres (F) Staffeln	5	52	41
KGr zbV	1 1/3	62	22
Wetterstaffeln	1	8	6
Seefliegerstaffeln	3	35	30
Seenotstaffeln	1	13	10
Kurierstaffeln/Verb. Staffeln	10	65	59
Sanitatsflugbereitschaften	1	6	6
		<b>822</b>	<b>638</b>
<b>Number of Aircraft by type:</b>			
Single Engine Fighters		213	176
Twin Eng Fighters / Ftr Bmbrs		0	0
Twin Eng Night Fighters		0	0
Single Eng Fighter Bombers		0	0
Dive Bombers		0	0
Twin Engine Bombers		271	211
Four Engine Bombers		0	0
Long Range Recon*		70	54
SR Recon / Army Coop^		152	129
Seaplanes		48	40
Transport Aircraft**		68	28
		<b>822</b>	<b>638</b>
* Includes Wetterstaffeln aircraft.			
^ Includes Courier, Liaison aircraft.			
** Includes Sanitatsflugbereitschaften aircraft.			
<b>Total Combat Aircraft*</b>			
		<b>689</b>	<b>551</b>
*Excludes aircraft in KGr zbV, Kurierstaffeln, and Sanitatsflugbereitschaften.			
<b>Aircraft Under Tactical Control of the Army</b>			
Long Range Reconnaissance		52	41
Short Range Recon. / Army Coop.^		152	129
		<b>204</b>	<b>170</b>
^ Includes Courier, Liaison Aircraft.			
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Extract from Volume IIB 5. 2)

*Extract from Volume IIB.5.2)*