The
technical superiority of the T-34 in 1941 (and during WWII in general)
has become the stuff of legend. Its apparent superiority has become so
entrenched in the psyche of post WWII authors that it is now assumed
without question. Some go as far as to claim the T-34 as “the finest
tank of the twentieth century” and the T-34 “rendered the entire fleet
of German tanks as effectively obsolete”.(1)
However, if battle performance was (and indeed still is) the ultimate
determinant of the effectiveness of any weapon system, then unlike some
legends in WWII, the tactical combat record of the T-34 does not match
up to its legendary status. An objective look at the T-34’s record,
without preconceptions, reveals questions which are hard to answer
given the T-34’s apparent superiority.
(1)
Eg, T. Bean, W. Fowler, Russian Tanks of WWII-Stalin’s Armoured Might,
Ian Allan Publishing, London, 2002, p. 61. Also, B. Taylor, Barbarossa
to Berlin, Volume One, Spellmount Ltd, Staplehurst, UK, 2003, p. 61.
Also B. Taylor, Barbarossa to Berlin, Volume One, Spellmount Ltd,
Staplehurst, UK, 2003, p. 31.Return to Top of Page
T-34 and KV Tanks Were Only Available in Small Numbers in 1941?
There
is little doubt that as an all round tank the T-34 was the most
powerful medium tank in the world in 1941, with far reaching influences
on future tank design. Historically, the poor showing of the T-34 in
1941 has been entirely attributed to the general state of the Red
Army’s mechanised forces in 1941, and the ‘small’ number of T-34s
available. This is accomplished with statements along the lines that
‘T-34 and KV tanks were only available in small numbers’, and ‘the
small number of available tanks were distributed amongst the Army in
small packets’.(2)These statements
are only true if the number of T-34s involved is measured relative to
other Soviet tank types available during the second half of 1941, and
not if measured against the number of German tanks available during the
same period. Logically, it is only the latter comparison that is
important if assessing relative combat performance.
From June to
December 1941, the Soviets either already had in service or placed in
service, a total of at least 3 017 T-34s out of a manufactured total of
3 111.(3)This is not a small
number even by later WWII standards. With this number, the T-34 tanks
must have been much more established than common perception.
The
total number of German Pz IIIs, Pz IVs and StuG assault guns committed
to the East Front during the entire period under consideration, was 2
686.(4)This figure includes Pz
IIIs with only 37mm guns, all the tanks in all the units that arrived
as reinforcements, and all replacements up to December 1941. These were
the only general issue German AFVs with any reasonable chance of
success in one to one combat with a T-34 or KV tank, and based on a
cursory analysis of armour and firepower, this chance was theoretically
low. In other words, even in 1941 the Red Army fielded over 1.1 times
more T-34s than any German AFV ‘theoretically’ capable of taking them
on. (If we add the 1 563 even more powerful KV I and II tanks fielded
by the Soviets in 1941, this figure increases to 1.7). This is before
we even consider the thousands of other tank types, that the same
German Pz IIIs, Pz IVs and StuGs had to fight against during 1941.
(2) Eg, B. Taylor, Barbarossa to Berlin, Volume One, Spellmount Ltd, Staplehurst, UK, 2003, p. 27. (3)
This includes: 1225 T-34s manufactured before 22nd June 1941, of which
957 were in service with the Red Army. In addition 1886 were
manufactured from 22nd June to December 1941, of which at least 95%, or
1792 entered service. (4) Excludes 210
Pz III command tanks, which had long and short range radios, and only
MGs. Refer Part V – ‘German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) from June to
December 1941: the German Fully Integrated Land and Air Resource Model’. Return to Top of Page
T-34 and KV Tanks Were Distributed Amongst the Army in Small Packets in 1941?
So
what about the ‘small packet’ statements regarding T-34 deployments? On
22nd June 1941 the majority of T-34 tanks were actually concentrated in
several powerful units, and not dispersed in small packets. For
example, the 4th and 7th Tank Divisions, 6th Mechanised Corps, Western
Special Military District had 238 T-34s and 114 KVs on strength on 22nd
June 1941. The 8th and 32nd Tank Divisions, 4th Mechanised Corps, Kiev
Special Military District had 313 T-34s and 99 KVs on strength on 22nd
June 1941. Considering that T-34 and KV tanks apparently ‘rendered all
German tanks as obsolete’, then these four tank divisions easily
represented the most powerful concentrated armoured formations in the
world during the whole of 1941 and well into 1942. From late August
1941 the Red Army started creating tank brigades, each with 29
authorised T-34 and KV tanks (and 38-64 lighter tanks depending on
TOE). By October 1941 many of these tank brigades were in action, but
by then many of the panzer division’s panzer regiments were dispersed
over wide areas and had far fewer numbers of operational tanks. In
short, by late 1941 the Germans had almost as many problems
concentrating their armour as the Soviets did. Return to Top of Page
The T34’s Overall Combat Results in 1941
The combat results for 1941 show the Soviets lost an average of over seven tanks for every German tank lost. (5)If all German fully tracked AFVs (assault guns, tank destroyers, SP
artillery, etc) and losses from Germany’s allies are included in the
German figures, then the ratio drops to 6.6 to 1 in the German favour. Of the total of 20 500 Soviet tanks lost in 1941, approximately 2 300 were T-34s and over 900 were mostly KV heavy tanks.(7)Even if the T-34’s loss ratio was better than seven for every German
tank, it was still most likely in the region of four or five to one.
Frankly, if 2 300 of any new Wehrmacht tank type had been lost within
six months of its first deployment, even with a loss ratio of one to
one (let alone 0.2-0.3 to one), then most WWII historians would have
described the tank’s combat record as an unmitigated diaster.
More
informed commentaries relating to the T-34’s combat performance in 1941
consider factors such as: the T-34 tank crews had little time to train
on their machines, they had major ammunition supply problems, and the
support infrastructures were not in place to recover damaged machines.
These arguments have a lot more merit than the ‘only small numbers
available’ or the ‘committed in small packets’ arguments. There is no
doubt that a large proportion of T-34s in 1941 fell victim to
operational type losses, especially in the situations the Red Army
found itself in during the summer of 1941. Many T-34s had little or no
armour piercing ammunition in June 1941, although they did in the
months that followed. Many T-34s were abandoned and lost due to
breakdown, being bogged down or simply out of fuel. The Red Army’s tank
divisions, already short of tractors, had little to no recovery
vehicles or even time to recover these tanks. However, even if we
assume a staggering 40-50% of T-34s were operational losses (which is
probably too high an estimate), then the T-34’s loss ratio in tactical
combat is still around two-three to one in the German favour.
(5)
T. Bean, W. Fowler, Russian Tanks of WWII-Stalin’s Armoured Might, Ian
Allan Publishing, London, 2002, appendix, p170. Also, S. J. Zaloga,
L.S. Ness, Red Army Handbook 1939-1945, Sutton Publishing, Stroud, UK,
1998, p. 181, table 6.3. 20 500 Soviet tanks lost vs. 2 758 German
tanks lost in 1941. (6) Refer Part III
3. 9) d. ‘Relative Overall Combat Proficiency (ROCP): the ROCP of
Soviet and Axis Forces from 1941-1945 - Axis and Soviet Relative
Overall Combat Proficiency (ROCP) in 1941 - Weapon Density (WD) Effects
on the 1941 German-Soviet ROCP - Fully Tracked AFVs (Tanks, Assault
Guns, Tank Destroyers, Armoured Self Propelled Artillery): WD Effects
on the 1941 German-Soviet ROCP’. German losses include 248 losses from
Germany’s allies in 1941. 20 500 Soviet tanks lost vs. 3 087 Axis fully
tracked AFVs lost in 1941. (7) G.F.
Krivosheev , et al, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the
Twentieth Century, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, Greenhill
Books, London, 1997. p. 252, table 95. Return to Top of Page
The T-34’s Design Weaknesses
When
one considers the apparent superiority of the T-34, the question has to
be asked: why did the T-34 consistently suffer at least a two-three to
one loss ratio against ‘inferior and obsolescent’ enemy tanks in
tactical combat, i.e. when actually shooting at each other? Either the
German’s combat proficiency was supernatural, the Soviet’s combat
proficiency was unbelievably incompetent, or there were design flaws
inherent in the T-34 as a complete weapon system which are not apparent
in a cursory analysis of combat power based on armour and gun
penetration. I believe the latter to be the case. The T-34/76’s one
great weakness was its fire control efficiency. It suffered from the
same two-man turret syndrome as other Soviet tanks in this period,
namely that the tank’s commander, gun aimer, gun firer and platoon
commander (if a platoon leader), were all the same person. Exacerbating
this was the fact that the T-34/76 had relatively poor main gun optics
quality, no turret basket, a very cramped and low turret (the gun could
not depress more than three degrees severely restricting use on a
reverse slope or at close range), poor turret drive reliability, no
radios, and generally poor target observation and indicator devices
(including no turret cupola and only one vision periscope for the
tank’s commander). All these factors are considered in detail in
calculating a tank’s Fire Control Effect (FCE) factor detailed in Part
II-‘The Barbarossa Simulation’s Resource Database’. The T-34 is
discussed here as a case history.(8) In summary, the T-34/76’s inherent fire control efficiency was so bad
that even well trained and experienced tank crews were put at a severe
disadvantage. For inexperienced tank crews, with no radios and probably
no organised combined arms support, it was a disaster.
So what
was the result of the T-34/76’s two man turret, weak optics and poor
vision devices (that is a poor overall FCE factor)? German tankers
noted “T34s operated in a disorganised fashion with little
coordination, or else tended to clump together like a hen with its
chicks. Individual tank commanders lacked situational awareness due to
the poor provision of vision devices and preoccupation with gunnery
duties. A tank platoon would seldom be capable of engaging three
separate targets, but would tend to focus on a single target selected
by the platoon leader. As a result T-34 platoons lost the greater
firepower of three independently operating tanks”.(9)
The Germans noted the T-34 was very slow to find and engage
targets while the Panzers could typically get off three rounds for
every one fired by the T-34.(10)
A
combat account from Operation Barbarossa highlights the problem with
the T-34/76’s fire control systems and also why its overall combat
power is so overrated. “Remarkably enough, one determined 37mm gun crew
reported firing 23 times against a single T-34 tank, only managing to
jam the tank’s turret ring”.(11) In this
engagement T-34 proponents will highlight the impunity of the T-34 to
the 37mm Pak 36 AT gun. However this is hardly surprising against a gun
that can only penetrate 29mm of 30 degree sloped armour at 500metres
with ordinary AP ammunition. What is really important in this story is
that the AT gun managed to get 23 shots off, and it turns out that the
T-34 in this report didn’t even manage to hit the AT gun. Once better
AT guns appeared, which they rapidly did, T-34s would be lucky to
survive 2-3 rounds. Contemporary German tank crews would have been be
appalled if they let enemy AT guns get more than two rounds off before
they took defensive action. This example highlights the difference
between tanks designed to optimise all their fire control related
systems and hence maximise their firepower, and those that weren’t.
(8)
Refer Part II 2. 3) h. ‘The Barbarossa Simulation’s Resource Database
- Methodology for Calculating a Weapon System’s or Database
Unit’s Overall Combat Power Coefficient (OCPC) - Calculating a Land
Based, Motorised Mobile Fighting Machine’s (MFM’s) Overall Combat Power
Coefficient (OCPC) - Fire Control Effect (FCE)’. (9) S. Zaloga , P. Sarson, T-34/76 Medium Tank 1941-1945, Osprey Military, Reed International Books Ltd, London, 1994, p. 40. (10) Ibid, p. 40. (11) Ibid, p. 12. Return to Top of Page
The T-34’s Performance in 1942
The
problem with using 1941 figures however is that T-34 proponents will
always argue that the operational state of the Soviet mechanised forces
and the general situation in 1941 were the primary factors in the
T-34’s combat performance in 1941. So what of the T-34’s combat record
in later years when these factors were removed or when they swung in
the Soviet’s favour?
The combat results for 1942, 1943, 1944 and
1945 show the Soviets lost an average of 6, 4, 4 and 1.2 tanks
respectively, for every German tank lost.(12)
If all German and Soviet assault guns, and all other types of fully
tracked AFV losses are included, then the ratio changes to 5, 3, 3 and
1.3 for 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945 respectively, in the German favour.(13)
The figures for 1945 are not much use as the majority of German losses
were operational or strategic, i.e. they are classified as lost when
Germany surrendered in 1945. The figures for 1942 to 1944 are more
useful in assessing the T-34’s tactical combat performance.
The
year 1942 deserves particular attention, because at the operational
level the sides were more evenly matched. In this year the most common
Soviet main battle tank was the T-34/76. The most common German main
battle tanks were Pz IIIs with long and short 50mm guns and Pz IVs,
most still with short 75mm L/24 guns. The Pz IV and StuG assault guns
with long 75mm L/43 or L/48 guns had only began appearing on the East
Front in limited numbers. This gun was capable of destroying a T-34
frontally at around 1 000 metres. However, only 870 Pz IVs and 699 StuG
IIIs with the long 75mm gun were manufactured in the whole of 1942, and
many of these didn’t reach the East Front until 1943.(14) Hence for most of 1942 the majority of German tanks were still the
older and apparently obsolete types. In addition many publications rate
the Pz IV with the long 75mm gun as only equivalent to the T-34/76 in
terms of firepower, but still much weaker in terms of armour and
mobility.
So what happened? The Soviets still managed to loose
15 100 fully tracked AFVs in 1942 including 6 600 T-34s and 1 200 of
the even more powerful KV heavy tanks.(15)
This meant their loss ratio was almost as bad as 1941. To a large
extent it was worse than 1941 because in this case over half the tanks
destroyed were T-34 and KV tanks, and the large majority of losses were
due to direct enemy fire and cannot be attributed to operational
losses. There is no doubt that on average German tank crews in 1942
were probably still the best trained and most experienced in the world.
However, this does not explain how apparently obsolete and inferior
German AFVs achieved a kill ratio of better than three to one against
T-34s in direct combat, unless the overall combat power of the T-34 is
historically overrated.(16) The
T-34 must be the only tank in history rated as the best in the world in
the same year it lost three or four for every enemy AFV destroyed.
*** It is also worth taking a look at the
principal causes of T-34 losses from June 1941 to September 1942. A
Soviet wartime study indicates the following weapon types as
responsible for T-34’s destroyed.(17)
Causes of T-34 losses from June 1941 to September 1942 (expressed as % of total).
Weapon Calibre
20mm
37mm
Short 50mm
Long 50mm
75mm
88mm
105mm
Unknown
% Lost
4.7
10
7.5
54.3
10.1
3.4
2.9
7.1
It
is well known that the only German weapon fielded in 1941 normally
capable of destroying a T-34 or KV at long range, was the 8.8cm Flak
18/36 (88mm Anti Aircraft Gun). Accordingly the Flak 18/36 achieved a
fearsome reputation as a tank destroyer on both the East and West
Fronts. In many battles during 1941 and to a lesser extent 1942, the
‘88’ is often credited with stopping T-34s and KVs when all else had
failed. However, we find from above that relatively few T-34s were
destroyed by 88s and almost as many T-34s were destroyed by artillery.
Either way, relatively few T-34s (6.3%) were destroyed by flak guns or
artillery at long range. It also appears (as we would expect) that
relatively few were destroyed by direct attack from aircraft (probably
some of the unknown and possibly some of the 20mm). Most significantly,
approximately three quarters of T-34s were destroyed by standard issue
1941-42 German tanks and AT guns (excluding 75mm guns). These weapons
(20-50mm) would have needed to get perilously close to a T-34
frontally, or hit it in its more vulnerable side or rear armour. The
conclusion has to be that the large majority of T-34s were destroyed
because their crews could not pre-empt these weapons from getting into
a killing position (usually because no crew member was in a position to
see the enemy early), and were slow to acquire the enemy target once it
became known. This is consistent with a very poor Fire Control
Efficiency (FCE) factor in the T-34/76.
(12) T.
Bean, W. Fowler, Russian Tanks of WWII-Stalin’s Armoured Might, Ian
Allan Publishing, London, 2002, appendix, p. 170. Also, S. J. Zaloga,
L.S. Ness, Red Army Handbook 1939-1945, Sutton Publishing, Stroud, UK,
1998, p. 181, table 6.3. (13) Refer Part III ‘Relative Overall Combat Proficiency (ROCP): the ROCP of Soviet and Axis Forces from 1941-1945’. (14)
P. Chamberlain, H Doyle, T Jentz, Encyclopedia of German Tanks of WWII,
Arms and Armour Press, London, 1978, appendix VII, p. 261. The Germans
also produced several hundred self propelled AT guns on obsolete tank
chassis in an attempt to get more powerful mobile AT guns to the front
as soon as possible. (15) G.F.
Krivosheev , et al, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the
Twentieth Century, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, Greenhill
Books, London, 1997. p. 252, table 95. (16)
This assumes the German kill ratio against Soviet light tanks in 1942
to be around 8-9 to one. If this was lower, the T-34s kill ratio drops
even further in the German favour. (17)
S. J. Zaloga, L.S. Ness, Red Army Handbook 1939-1945, Sutton
Publishing, Stroud, UK, 1998, p. 179, table 6.1. Also, T. Bean, W.
Fowler, Russian Tanks of WWII-Stalin’s Armoured Might, Ian Allan
Publishing, London, 2002, appendix, p. 171. This table should be
treated with caution, and some of the figures appear dubious. For
example, it is highly likely that more T-34s were destroyed by long
75mm guns and these could easily have been mistaken by Soviet
intelligence as long 50mm guns. Return to Top of Page
The T-34’s Performance in 1943
By
1943 the strategic initiative had swung in the Soviets favour.
Operationally the sides were similar, but as better German tanks
reached the battlefield the combat power of individual AFVs had started
to swing against the Soviets. Nevertheless, many current publications
still rate the T-34/76 as the best all round medium tank in the
world, until the advent of the Panther tank which appeared in limited
numbers after mid 1943. Despite the Germans loosing large numbers of
tanks as operational losses (due to them being abandoned on the
battlefield as they retreated) and erosion of tank crew quality, they
still achieved a fully tracked AFV kill ratio of around three to one
during 1943. In this year the Soviets lost a staggering 23 500 fully
tracked AFVs including 14 700 T-34s, 1 300 heavy tanks and only 6 400 light tanks.(18)
Close to two thirds (63%) of AFVs lost were T-34s. As in 1941 and 1942,
at least three T-34s were lost for every enemy fully tracked AFV
destroyed. The vast majority of these losses were due to direct enemy
fire and cannot be attributed to operational losses, because by 1943
the Soviets were most often gaining control of the battlefield and were
recovering almost all disabled and partially destroyed tanks. Indeed,
it was the Germans who were suffering increasing numbers of operational
losses, so if anything the T-34’s tactical loss ratio in 1943 was
probably closer to four or five to one.
(18) G.F.
Krivosheev , et al, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the
Twentieth Century, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, Greenhill
Books, London, 1997. p. 252, table 95. Return to Top of Page
The T-34’s Performance in 1944
Even
the Soviets realised that the 1943 loss/kill ratio was unsustainable. In order to restore
the technological balance they attenuated T-34/76 production and moved
quickly to up gun the T-34 with a new turret and the 85mm M-1944
ZIS-S53 L/51.5 gun, designated the T-34/85.
By 1944 the Soviets
had the absolute strategic initiative, with massive numerical
superiority, and in terms of supply distribution and support,
operational superiority. They had the luxury of being able to
concentrate large armoured forces at any points on the front they
desired while still being able to strongly defend everywhere. In terms
of tactical combat proficiency, the Soviets could claim to have tank
crews as well trained and experienced as the Germans. In addition the
RAF and USAF had given the Soviets critical air superiority for the
first time. For most of 1944 the Soviets had technical parity in terms
of AFVs, with the large majority of T-34s now being the T-34/85s. The
Soviets, and most modern publications, claim the T-34/85 was much
superior to any model Pz IV or StuG assault gun and similar in combat
power to the Panther. On top of this the Soviets had large numbers of
the new IS-2 heavy tanks, one of the most powerful tanks in WWII, as
well as the almost equally powerful ISU-122 and ISU-152 assault
guns.(19)
In 1944 the Soviets still managed to lose 23 700 fully
tracked AFVs of which only 2 200 were light tanks: the highest number
of AFV losses in a single year by any country in history.(20) Of
these losses 58% were T-34s, the large majority being T-34/85s. Despite
all possible factors being in their favour and despite massive German
operational losses during 1944, the Soviets still managed to loose
around three AFVs for every German AFV destroyed, or around four tanks
(mostly T-34/85s) for every German tank destroyed.
(19)
T. Bean, W. Fowler, Russian Tanks of WWII-Stalin’s Armoured Might, Ian
Allan Publishing, London, 2002 p. 23, claims the IS-2 was “the most
powerful tank of WWII”. The IS-2 and ISU assault guns were apparently a
“source of amazement” to the Germans. Interestingly enough the IS-2
also had a poor tank vs. tank kill/loss ratio, but this tank was
optimised for break through attacks against fortified positions, and
not for tank vs. tank combat. (20)
G.F. Krivosheev , et al, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the
Twentieth Century, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, Greenhill
Books, London, 1997. p. 253, table 95.
Conclusions Regarding the T-34’s Overall Performance as a ‘War Winner’
The
T-34 is possibly the only weapon system in history to be rated by most
commentators as the finest all round weapon in a century of warfare,
and yet never consistently achieved anything better than a one to three
kill-loss ratio against its enemies.(21) The fact that the USSR
produced 54 550 T-34s (easily the most widely produced tank of WWII)
and hence produced a ‘war winning’ tank is a separate strategic level
discourse and should not be confused with giving the T-34 credit for
being effective at the tactical level.
Undoubtedly the T-34 went
a long way to enabling the USSR to be ultimately victorious, but the
price was huge with approximately 44 900 T-34s (82% of total
production) being irrecoverably lost. Soviet output during WWII was 99
150 fully tracked AFVs (including all types of assault and
self-propelled guns) produced from June 1941 to May 1945, and an
additional 11 900 tanks and self-propelled guns received via Lend
Lease.(22) The Germans are often criticised for their low tank
production during WWII: being accused of producing too few high quality
tanks with too many refinements and excessive quality control during
production. In support of this statement the figure of only 26 900
German tanks is quoted as being produced during WWII. However tanks
formed only part of German AFV production: they actually produced 26
925 tanks, 612 command tanks, 232 flame tanks, 10 550 assault guns, 7
831 tank destroyers, and 3 738 assault and self-propelled artillery
AFVs, from 1938 to May 1945.(23) A total of around 49 900 fully
tracked AFVs out of a total production of 89 254 AFVs of all types.
This represents around 50% of Soviet fully tracked AFV production
during WWII. It should be remembered (a fact that seems to be often
forgotten) that Allied strategic bombing reduced German AFV production
by at least 10% in 1943, 40% in 1944 and even more during 1945, exactly
when German AFV production had peaked.
There is no doubt that
German tanks possessed many refinements, subtleties of design and high
quality components which contributed to a relatively slow production
rate. In comparison Soviet tanks had a generally rough and ready
finish, and lacked many features which were assumed essential by German
tankers and to a large extent by their Western Allied counterparts.
There were of course considerably more Soviet tanks, which ultimately
helped them to win the war. Nonetheless, it was these same refinements
and subtleties of design which gave German tank crews the edge in
combat at the tactical level, and it is these which are picked up in
the methodology detailed in Part II-‘The Operation Barbarossa: the
Complete Military Simulation- The Barbarossa Simulation’s Resource
Database’. As always, the Soviets had a choice regarding weapon system
production during WWII: they could have mass produced more lower
quality and less refined AFVs, or produced less more refined and higher
quality AFVs. They chose the former and achieved strategic success, but
payed an exceptionally high price in terms of human life. In terms of
AFVs, this ‘price’ was the loss of 96 500 fully tracked AFVs compared
to 32 800 German fully tracked AFVs (on the East Front) during WWII
(2.94 to 1).(24)The German losses include all SP guns, SP artillery,
and several thousand vehicles captured when Germany surrendered.
One
very significant point about these figures is that if we remove the 11
900 AFVs received by the Soviets via Lend Lease, and allocate all
German WWII fully tracked AFV production to the Wehrmacht’s East Front
forces (i.e. add those lost fighting the Western Allies), then the
Germans would have only needed kill loss ratio of 2.45 to 1 in order to
have destroyed all Soviet fully tracked AFVs that existed on 22nd June
1941 (23 300 AFVs) and all 99 150 fully tracked AFVs produced during
the war (122 450 AFVs). This figure is well below the 2.94 to 1
kill-loss ratio historically achieved. These figures demolish another
more recently fashionable myth relating to the East Front; specifically
that the Soviets (largely due to the huge number of T-34s produced)
could have won WWII without any input from the US or Commonwealth
forces. This is before we even consider the effects of increased German
production (of all weapon types) due to the absence of Allied strategic
bombing, the direct effects of German air superiority on the East Front
from 1943 onwards, the effects of the Red Army loosing over half its
motorised transport, and the effects of 9-10 000
additional (and fully supplied) heavy 88mm flak guns on the East Front from 1941 onwards.
The
ongoing discourse on the strategic decisions regarding weapon
manufacture is not particularly relevant here: we are specifically
focused on the inherent tactical combat power present in specific AFV
designs. In the T-34’s case however, there appears to be confusion
among T-34 enthusiasts between the strategic features of the T-34’s
design (ease of manufacture, simplicity of design, etc) and the
tactical features of its design (the overall combat power (OCPC)
inherent in the individual vehicle). To put it another way, the T-34
was a ‘war winning’ tank but this should not detract from the fact that
at a tactical level its performance during four years of continuous war
was relatively poor. If there was ever a case for not basing a tank’s
overall combat power on over simplified parameters such as thickness
and slope of frontal armour, and penetration of a single round from its
main gun, then the T-34’s case is it.